The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of λ -discounted games as the discount tends to zero. Under quite weak assumptions on the game, we prove the Uniform Tauberian Theorem: existence a of uniform limit for one of the value functions implies the uniform convergence of the other one to the same limit. We also prove the analogs of the One-sided Tauberian Theorem, i.e., the inequalities on asymptotics of the lower and upper game. Special attention is devoted to the case of differential games. The key roles in the proof were played by Bellman's optimality principle and the closedness of strategies under concatenation.
Introduction. Hardy once proved (see, for example, [32] ) that if all numbers a i are bounded, then
This result was named a Tauberian theorem in honor of the similar result obtained by Tauber for convergent series. Theorems of this kind, in particular, provide the means for obtaining good estimates for sums of series with the use of faster methods of summation. For a more detailed treatment of the history of those results, see, for example, [11] and [36] . There are also Tauberian theorems for functions, in particular (see, for example, [31, Sect. 6.8] ), for a bounded continuous function g , the limit of long run averages and limit of discounted averages What if we optimize the Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean and then consider the limit of the optimal values corresponding to them? Such limit value (as the discount tends to zero) was first considered in [12] for a stochastic formulation. As proved in [44] , for a stochastic two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal long-time averages and optimal discounted averages share the common limit. For more details on limit value for Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean in other stochastic formulations, see [15, 57] .
In the deterministic case, the question of existence of limit values arose in the control theory, time and again; one may at the very least note [18, 27, 43] . In the ergodic case (more generally, in the nonexpansive-like case) such limits exist and, moreover, they are independent of the initial state [2, 4, 5, 6, 8] . For the latest results on existence of limit values (first of all, in the nonergodic case), refer to [28, 29, 47] ; see also the review in [14, Sect. 3.4] . For discrete time systems, the equality of limit values was proved earlier in [42] . For a bibliography on discrete statements, refer to [48] .
For control problems, the equality of limit values in the case when at least one of those limits is constant was first proved in [3] . The very general case of dynamic system was considered in paper [46] . Namely, it was proved there that existence of a uniform (on the set of states) limit for the value of one of the means implies the uniform convergence for value of the other one to the same limit. That paper also contains a beautiful introduction to the history of the subject and a review of publications in the field.
There is only a rather small number of publications concerned with the study of the limits of optimal averages in differential games. These are, first of all, [1, 8, 16] and, in addition, [10, 30] .
In differential games of the special kind, those limits may be connected with the asymptotic value of zero-sum repeated games; a good discussion of this issue is presented in [51] .
But, as noted in [46] for differential games, "When the dynamic is controlled by two players with opposite goals, a Tauberian theorem is given in the ergodic case by Theorem 2.1 in [1] .
However, the general, nonergodic case is still an open problem in both the discrete and the continuous settings."
In this paper, we show a number of uniform Tauberian theorems for dynamic two-person games with zero sum, in particular, for differential games. Our approach to proofs continues the ideas of [44] , [46] : the Bellman principle of optimality and the closedness of strategies under concatenation. Under these circumstances, the specifics of a game with saddle point (in particular, of a differential game under Isaacs condition) allows to streamline the proof of the uniform Tauberian theorem as related to them. Such proof reduces to the two inequalities for the lower and upper games, respectively; following [11] and [31] , we call those inequalities
One-sided Tauberian theorems. After that, the proof of One-sided Tauberian theorem boils down to the application of the suboptimality principle to the strategy that is constructed in a special way through concatenation.
Recall that [46] provides an example showing that the Tauberian theorem for control problem may not hold if the limits are not uniform over the strongly invariant set of positions. The condition of existence of a uniform limit in the case of Tauberian theorem for dynamic games is certainly as significant. However, this condition may be relaxed. In this paper, we do it in two ways. The first way follows the idea of [33] : it consists of requiring the value function of the game to be slowly varying (or even monotonous) instead of imposing on it the condition of existence of the uniform limit. The second way consists of combatting the lack of uniformity of the limit of the value function by using the One-sided Tauberian theorem with a weaker estimate having, however, the uniform limit. The paper implements the first method for an abstract formulation and the second method for differential games.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with an axiomatic definition of a rather general game problem statement in the framework of the dynamic model proposed in [46] (see Sect. 1); for this problem, we formulate One-sided Tauberian theorems for lower game (Theorem 1) and for upper game (Corollary 1), and also the uniform Tauberian theorem for game a with saddle points (Theorem 2). In the next Section (Section 2), we show the connection between the One-sided Tauberian theorem, slowly varying functions, and suboptimality principle. Section 3 serves to transfer the results obtained for the abstract problem statement onto the case of differential games: we consider the corresponding uniform Tauberian theorem (Theorem 3) and its generalizations; in the same section, we construct the version of One-sided
Tauberian theorems with the aid of sub-and supersolutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs.
All proofs are located in Appendix.
We would like to note that Theorem 3 was also announced in [34, 35] .
Generally following [46] , we make all our constructions in the framework of a rather general continuous-time dynamic model. Dynamic system. Assume T △ = R ≥0 . Assume the following items are given:
• a set Ω of states;
• a set K of feasible processes, which is a subset of mappings from T to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω → [0, 1]; for each process z ∈ K, assume the map t → g(z(t)) is Borel-measurable.
We would also need the set
defined for each ω ∈ Ω . This is the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K starting from ω .
Let us now define Cesaro mean v T (z) and Abel mean w λ (z) for each process z ∈ K by the rules:
Note that the definitions are valid, and the means lie within [0, 1]. The number v T is the average running cost on the interval [0, T ] , and the number w λ is the λ -discounted average cost. The functions v T , w λ will be treated as the payoff functions in their respective games.
Assumptions on the capabilities of players. Assume we are given a family A of subsets of the set K . Call a subset A ∈ A of the set K a playable strategy if for every initial position
Let us now define the operations on processes and playable strategies. For a time τ ∈ T and a process z ∈ K , define the function z τ : T → Ω by the following rule:
In addition to time-shift, let us also define concatenation. Let τ ∈ T, z ′ , z ′′ ∈ K be such that z ′ (τ ) = z ′′ (0). Then, their concatenation z ′ ⋄ τ z ′′ is defined by the following rule:
Now, for each two playable strategies A ′ , A ′′ and a time τ ∈ T , define their concatenation by
To get rid of excessive parentheses, let us hereinafter assume
Call a family A closed under backward shift if, for all A ∈ A , τ > 0 , there exists a A ′ ∈ A such that
Note that in this case, for all ω ∈ Ω , we automatically have the equality {z τ | z ∈ A} ∩ Γ(ω) = A ′ ∩ Γ(ω) if the set in the left-hand side of the equality is not empty.
We say that a family A of playable strategies allows the separation of ω (at the initial time) if, for each mapping ξ : Ω → A ,
We hereinafter impose the following conditions on A :
(P) A is some family of playable strategies;
(τ ) A is closed under backward shift;
(ω) A allows the separation of ω (at the initial time).
Formalization of lower game. Consider a two-player game. The first player wishes to maximize a payoff function c : K → R ; the second player wishes to minimize it. The first player also has a family A of playable strategies specified.
The game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player demonstrates some set A in A , and then the second player chooses a process z ∈ A∩Γ(ω) ; we have a conflict:
The value function of this game is
In particular, for T > 0, λ > 0 , consider the values
Note that for every playable strategy A , A ∩ Γ(ω) = ∅; therefore, those definitions are valid.
Moreover, for bounded payoff c axiom (ω) guarantees the existence of a strategy, the result of which is close to the optimum uniformly for ω ∈ Ω (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A).
The main result for lower game. Consider a function S : Ω → R .
Definition 1 Let us say that a lower game ( 1 ) (respectively, or ( 2a ) , or ( 2b ) ) provides a
Let us say that a lower game family with payoffs v T (respectively, or w λ ) provides an asymptotic guarantee S if for all ε > 0 there exists T 0 > 0 (respectively, λ 0 > 0 ) such that S − ε is a guarantee for lower game with payoff v T for every T > T 0 (respectively, with payoff w λ for every positive λ < λ 0 ).
If there exists a limit of V ♭ T that is uniform on Ω :
then this limit V ♭ * is the common asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with v T and w λ .
If there exists a limit of W ♭ λ that is uniform on Ω :
then, W ♭ * is the common asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with v T and w λ .
The proof of this theorem would follow from Propositions 1,2 (see Section 2).
Formalization of upper game. We still have two players, the first player maximizes the payoff c , whereas the second player minimizes it. Let the second player also have a family B of playable strategies.
The upper game is conducted in the following way. Given ω ∈ Ω, let the second demonstrate some set B in B , then let the second player choose some process z ∈ B ∩ Γ(ω) ; we have the conflict:
The value function of upper game is
Consider a function S : Ω → R .
Definition 2 Let us say that upper game ( 5a ) (respectively, ( 5b ) ) provides a guarantee S
) for all ω ∈ Ω . Let us say that upper game family with payoffs v T (or w λ ) provides an asymptotic guarantee S if for all ε > 0 there exists T 0 > 0 (respectively, λ 0 > 0 ) such that S + ε is a guarantee for the upper game with v T for every T > T 0 (or with w λ for every positive λ < λ 0 ).
Comparing ( 4 ) , ( 5a ) , ( 5b ) with ( 1 ) , ( 2a ) , ( 2b ) , note that the upper game with the running cost g and value function C ♯ is equivalent to the lower game with the running cost 1 − g and the value function C ♭ = 1 − C ♯ . Now, Theorem 1 for running cost 1 − g implies the next result.
If there exists a limit of V ♯ T that is uniform on Ω :
then V ♯ * is the common asymptotic guarantee for upper game families with v T and w λ . If there exists a limit of W ♯ λ that is uniform on Ω :
then W ♯ * is the common asymptotic guarantee for upper game families with v T and w λ .
Uniform Tauberian theorem for games with saddle point. If lower and upper games with c provide a common guarantee S , we have
and upper games with c have a unique common guarantee. In case C ♭ ≡ C ♯ , we say that game with the payoff c has a saddle point.
Definition 3 Let us say that a game family with payoffs v T has an asymptotic saddle point if
exists, is equal to 0 , and is uniform for ω ∈ Ω . Let us say that a game family with payoffs w λ has an asymptotic saddle point if the limit
exists, is equal to 0 , and is uniform for ω ∈ Ω .
Note that if there exists an asymptotic saddle point, the lower and upper game families provide at most one common asymptotic guarantee. Then, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply Theorem 2 Let A and B satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) , (ω) , (τ ) ; suppose that game families with payoffs v T and payoffs w λ have asymptotic saddle points.
Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists at least one of the limits ( 3a ) , ( 3b ) , ( 6a ) , ( 6b ) that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω .
there exists a common limit for
Thus, to prove all statements of the present section, it is sufficient to prove Theorem 1. Our main objective for the next Section is to prove this theorem and relax its assumptions.
2 One-sided Tauberian theorem.
On slowly varying functions. Consider a function S :
for each p > 1. Then S is said to be slowly varying at ∞ .
for each p > 1. Then S is said to be slowly varying at 0 .
Note that a function S is slowly varying at ∞ if there exists a limit of S at ∞ that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω. Analogously, the existence of the same limit at 0 implies slow variance at 0. Note that a bounded away from zero function S is slowly varying at ∞ iff
For the case of singleton Ω , [33] (see also [11 We also need
for each p > 1. Then S is said to be tightly decreasing at ∞ .
for each p > 1. Then S is said to be tightly increasing at 0 .
Call a function S : T × Ω → R tightly increasing at ∞ if −S is tightly decreasing at ∞ .
Call a function S : T × Ω → R tightly decreasing at 0 if −S is tightly increasing at 0 .
Note that every increasing in t function S : T × Ω → R is tightly increasing at 0 and tightly decreasing at ∞.
On suboptimality principles.
Definition 6 Let us say that a function S : R >0 × Ω → R is a subsolution for the lower game family with payoffs v T if, for every T > 0 , the lower game with payoff v T provides the guarantee S T , and S also satisfies suboptimality principle [9, Definition III.2.31] (also referred to as 'stability with respect to second player' [40] ), i.e., for all positive T ′ < T,
Definition 7 Let us say that a function S : R >0 × Ω → R is a subsolution for the lower game family with payoffs w λ if, for every λ > 0 , the lower game with payoff w λ provides the garantee S λ , and S λ satisfies suboptimality principle [9, Definition III.2.31], i.e.,
For a similar definition concerning discrete problems, refer to [9, Sect. VI.4].
By Lemma 2 (in Appendix A), under assumptions (P) , (τ ) , the function V ♭ T is a subsolution for the lower game family with v T . Then, the first part of Theorem 1 follows from the following Proposition, the proof of which is in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) , (ω) . Let the function S : R >0 × Ω → R be a subsolution for the lower game family with v T .
If S is tightly decreasing at ∞ , then, for every κ > 0 , there exists a natural N with
In particular, if there exists a limit of S T that is uniform on Ω :
then, S is tightly decreasing at ∞ , and S * is a common asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with v T and w λ .
By Lemma 3 (in Appendix A), under conditions (P) , (τ ) , the function W ♭ λ is a subsolution for the lower game family w λ . Now, the last part of Theorem 1 is implied by the following Proposition, which is proved in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) , (ω) . Let the function S : R >0 × Ω → R be a subsolution for the lower game family with w λ .
If S is tightly increasing at 0 , then, for every κ > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
In particular, if there exists a limit of S λ that is uniform on Ω :
then, S is tightly increasing at 0 , and S * is a common asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with v T and w λ .
Now we obtain Theorem 1 for lower games, Corollary 1 for upper games, Theorem 2 for games with asymptotic saddle point.
Note that condition (τ ) was only used for Lemmatae 2,3; therefore,
the game families of v λ and w λ , respectively. Then, (τ ) can be omitted from the assumptions of Theorems 1, ( 2 ) .
Tauberian theorems for differential games
Differential game statement Consider a nonlinear system in R m controlled by two playerṡ
here, A and B are compact subsets of finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
Here and below, we assume the functions f :
2. Lipshitz continuous in phase variable, namely, for a constant L > 0 ,
Remember that B(T, A) and B(T, B) are the sets of all Borel measurable functions T ∋ t → a(t) ∈ A and T ∋ t → b(t) ∈ B , respectively. Consider a set X ⊂ R m that is strongly invariant with respect to system ( 10 ) , i.e., let
Let us further assume the Isaacs condition (also referred to as 'solvability of the small game' [40] ) to hold, i.e.,
This condition not only provides the equality of lower and upper values but also a significant freedom of choice in formalization of strategies. There are many ways to define a game and the sets of strategies for each player; for a very well made review encompassing a large number of formalizations, refer to [52, Subsect.14, 15] . One of the earliest (see [50] , [49] , [25] ) approaches was to formalize the value of the game through nonanticipating strategies.
Definition 8 A strategy for the first player is a map α :
. We denote with A the set of nonanticipating strategies for the first player. Similarly, the set of nonanticipating strategies for the second player is
We may now assume that one player announces a nonanticipating strategy (from either A or B , respectively) and another, knowing it, selects a measurable control (either from B(T, B) or B(T, A) , respectively).
Like before, the task of the first player is to maximize the payoff function while the task of the second is to minimize it. Our payoff functions are the following:
Note that the Isaacs condition holds for the payoff functions v T and w λ . Then, the values of upper and lower games coincide:
The goal of the present section is to prove 
Reduction to the abstract formulation. Since the function g depends on a, b in addition to depending on x , let us set
Remember that Γ(ω) = {z = (y, a, b) ∈ K | z(0) = ω} for all ω ∈ Ω. It remains to describe
A, B.
It is not possible to directly construct the families A, B through non-anticipating strategies by obtaining Theorem 3 from Theorem 2. The fact is that, in differential games, axioms (ω), (⋄) necessitate the dependence (even if implicit) of strategies on the current position, i.e., the strategies must be of feedback type. Nonanticipating strategies are generally not so. To provide for the necessary axioms, we could (in the spirit of [58] ) expand A, B, in the way of replacing non-anticipating strategies with non-anticipating operators [19, 20, 21] , [22, p.180 ].
As it was demonstrated above, axiom (ω) guarantees the existence of a near-optimal strategy for all initial data. Among the feedback-type formalizations, one could note the following:
the class of feedback counterstrategies from [37] ; the class of feedback step-by-step strategies [40] , [ 2) for any x * ∈ X, b ∈ B(T, B), T > 0 , there exists a unique solution x(·) = y(·, x * , ζ, b) oḟ
Note that, under this definition, we may not assume the map ζ to be continuous; see [7] , [13] .
The definition directly implies that y(·, x * , ζ, b) can be uniquely extended up to a function from Y ⊂ C(T, X) ; therefore, we may take y(·, x * , ζ, b) ∈ Y . It is valid to consider
We denote by F the set of feedback MM-strategies for the first player. Let us finally define
Note that, for any
In particular, this set is nonempty, and condition (P) is valid.
Feedback MM-strategies for the second player are introduced in the similar way. Assign the set G of feedback MM-strategies to the second player; for each ξ ∈ G , assign the set of all motions y(·, x * , a, ξ) to all x * ∈ X, a ∈ B(T, A) ; and, at last, write the family B. Note that the set of MM-strategies may be restricted (for details, refer to [9, Remark VIII.3.14]) without changing upper or lower values. In particular, this may be done for feedback step-by-step strategies [52, Subsect. 11.2] (also referred as 'positional strategies' [40] , [39] ). Then, by the results of the classical differential games theory (see [40] , [52] ),
In case of the payoff w λ , it is more convenient to use [9, Theorem VIII.3.11], which would likewise yield
axioms hold for the introduced families A, B .
Since both the existence of y(·, On Hamilton-Jakobi-Isaacs PDEs. We would in fact prove more than that. Any viscosity subsolution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE satisfies a suboptimality principle. This property is well known and in fact is known by an alternative name 'weak and strong invariance'.
For finite-and infinite-horizon control systems, see [55] and [9, Theorem III.2.33], respectively.
For finite-horizon games with nonanticipating strategies, this result was explicitly proved in 
Those expressions for the Hamiltonians were taken from [52, (11.5) ] and [9, (VIII.1.16)], respectively. For the given function S , we would need mappings
As shown in Appendix D,
Proposition 3 For a terminal value problem
consider its subsolution S , i.e., a u.s.c. function S that satisfies
Then, the mapping ( 12a ) is a subsolution of lower game family with v T .
Remember that S : R ≤0 ×Ω → R is a supersolution of the terminal value problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) if l.s.c. function S satisfies
For such supersolutions, we can also formulate a result that is similar to Proposition 3 with the aid of the game with the running cost g
Now, applying Proposition 1 for mapping ( 12a ) , in view of
Corollary 2 Let function S : R ≤0 × R m → R be a subsolution (respectively, a supersolution) of the terminal value problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) . Suppose the mapping ( 12a ) is tightly decreasing (respectively, tightly increasing) at ∞ .
Then, for every κ > 0 , there exists a natural N such that for all T > N we have
i.e., let the u.s.c. bounded function S λ satisfy
Then, the mapping ( 12b ) is a subsolution for the game family with w λ .
Remember that for each λ > 0 , S λ ∈ BLSC(R m ) is a supersolution of Hamilton-Jacobi-
For such supersolutions, we can also formulate a result similar to Proposition 4 with the aid of the game with the running cost g
Now, by applying Proposition 1 in view of
V ♯ = V ♭ , W ♯ = W ♭ for this S ,
we have
Corollary 3 For each λ > 0 , let S λ be a subsolution (respectively, a supersolution) of ( 15 ) .
Suppose the mapping ( 12b ) is tightly increasing (respectively, tightly decreasing) at 0 .
Then, for every κ > 0 , there exists a natural N such that for all positive λ < 1/N we have
Recall that if a function has a uniform limit as T → ∞ (respectively, as λ → 0 ), then it is a slowly varying function at ∞ , (respectively, at 0 ); i.e., it is tightly increasing and tightly decreasing at ∞ , (respectively, at 0 ). Now, Corollaries 2,3 imply
Corollary 4
For each λ > 0 , let S λ be a subsolution (respectively, supersolution) of ( 15 ) .
If there exists a limit of λS λ (x * ) that is uniform for x * ∈ X :
then, S * is the common asymptotic guarantee for lower (respectively, upper) game families with payoffs v T and payoffs w λ .
Let the function S : R ≤0 × R m → R be a subsolution (respectively, a supersolution) of the terminal value problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) . If there exists a limit of
Corollary 5 Let u ∈ C(R ≤0 × R m ) be a minimax(viscosity) solution of the terminal value problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) . For a positive λ > 0 , letū λ ∈ BC(R m ) be the minimax solution of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE ( 15 ) .
1. there exists the limit
that is uniform for x ∈ X 2. there exists the limit
that is uniform for x ∈ X 3. each of the two limits of ( 17a ) and ( 17b ) exists for every x ∈ X and is uniform for x ∈ X ; moreover, these limits coincide.
Now, since V ♮ T and W ♮ λ are viscosity solutions of problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) and PDE ( 15 ) (see [52] , [9] ), Corollary 5 also implies Theorem 3.
A Auxiliary lemmata
Lemma 1 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (ω) . For a function S : ω → [0, 1] and a payoff c (including v T and w λ ), the lower game ( 1 ) provides the guarantee S . Then, for every
By the definition of guarantee, for every ε > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω there exists a strategy
Then, by the property (ω) , there exists the
which was to be proved.
Let us note that, by the definition, for all z ∈ K , positive T ′ , and T > T ′ ,
Lemma 2 Let the set A satisfy conditions (P) , (τ ) . Then, for all T > 0, 0 < T ′ < T ,
In particular, V ♭ T is a subsolution of lower game family with ( 2a ) .
P r o o f.
Fix arbitrary T > 0, 0 < T ′ < T, ω ∈ Ω. The lower game ( 2a ) provides the guarantee V ♭ T . Thanks to Lemma 1, for every δ > 0 ,
holds for some strategy A δ . For the sake of brevity, put
Note that A δ may be expressed as
, which is why there exist subsequent
since the first expression is independent of z
Thanks toz =z
by the choice of A δ . The positive number δ was arbitrary, therefore, we proved inequality ( 19 ) for all z ∈ Γ(ω). Since T > 0, 0 < T ′ < T, ω ∈ Ω were arbitrary, the proof of the lemma is complete.
Note that for all positive T, λ and a process z ∈ K
Lemma 3 Let the set A satisfy conditions (P) , (τ ) . Then, for all T > 0, λ > 0 , we have
In particular, W ♭ is a subsolution of lower game family with w λ .
Fix arbitrary T > 0, λ > 0, ω ∈ Ω. The lower game ( 2b ) provides the guarantee W ♭ λ . Thanks to Lemma 1, for every δ > 0 for some strategy A δ , we have :
For the sake of brevity, take
Note that A δ can be represented in the form A δ = A δ ⋄ T A ′′ , and there exist somez
since the first expression is independent of the process z ′ after T , forz
Since δ is an arbitrary positive number, inequality ( 21 ) holds for all z ∈ Γ(ω). Since T > 0, λ > 0, ω ∈ Ω were all arbitrary, the Lemma is now proved.
In fact, if we additionally have property ( ⋄ ), relations ( 19 ) , ( 21 ) Step 1. Preliminary constructions and estimates.
Fix a function S . It is sufficient to prove the statement for every sequence T n ↑ ∞. Fix a sequence T n ↑ ∞ .
It is easy to verify that ln p < p − 1 < p ln p if p > 1. To each natural number k > 2 , we can assign a number p > 1 such that
By definition of tightly decreasing function, for sufficiently large natural n , we have
Fix such k, p, n. Define
Then,
Step 2. Constructing a near-w λ payoff.
Define a piecewise constant function h on [0, τ k ) by the rule
Then, for t ∈ [0, τ k ) , we have t ∈ [τ i , τ i+1 ) for some i , and
≤
Consider a lower game with the following payoff
Note that, by S ≤ W ♭ and 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 , we have
Step 3. Constructing the strategy A * .
Recall that, since S is a subsolution, we have ( 8a ) . Consider a new lower game with the
Thanks to ( 8a ) , the new lower game provides the guarantee S T . Then, by Lemma 1, there exists a strategy A T ∈ A such that
now, by ( 24 ) and ( 18 ) , it is equivalent to
Let us also note that, since the right-hand sides of these inequalities depend only on z| [0,δ] , the strategy A T from ( 29 ) can be replaced with any strategy that could be represented in the form A T ⋄ δ A. For example, this is possible for strategy A *
Note that such A * exists in A by property (⋄) .
Note that, since the sufficiently large k, n (and, therefore, T n ), were chosen arbitrarily, to prove the proposition, it would suffice to demonstrate that
in accordance with ( 28 ) , this fact would follow from
Step 4. Proof of estimate ( 31 ) .
Then, for each z ∈ A * , i = 0, k − 1 ,
Summing over all the intervals [τ i , τ i+1 ] yields
Thus, the inequality ( 43 ) is proved.
N o t e 4 Note that condition ( 7b ) from the definition of tightly decreasing function was only used for ( 35 ) . Therefore, in that definition, instead of ( 7b ) , it would suffice to require lim inf D On a suboptimality principle for Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs PDEs
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider some functions σ ∈ BC(R m ) and τ ∈ C(R, R >0 ). Define Consider the terminal value problem ∂ S(t, x) ∂t + H(t, x, D x S(t, x)) = 0, S(0, x) = σ(x) ∀t ≤ 0, x ∈ R m .
Fix an arbitrary subsolution S of this terminal value problem, and the epigraph of this subsolution. For a given neighborhood of its epigraph, we can construct a feedback step-by-step strategy [52, Subsect. 11.2] that is viable in this neighborhood under any initial data from the given compact. The construction of such strategies was explicitly described in [52, Subsect.
12.2] (for a similar construction for control systems, refer to [23] ). Note that any feedback step-by-step strategy is a feedback MM-strategy [9, Remark VIII.3.14]. Therefore, there exists a feedback MM-strategy that provides the viability of processes in this neighborhood for all initial data from the given compact. Thanks to (ω) , for an arbitrary neighborhood of the epigraph of S , there exists a feedback MM-strategy that provides the viability of processes in this neighborhood for all initial data.
In particular, applying [52, (12.22) 
Remember that S is the subsolution of ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) ( ( 44 ) with σ ≡ 0, τ ≡ 1 ); then, S = S satisfies ( 45 ) , i.e., mapping ( 12a ) satisfies condition ( 19 ) .
By [52, Theorem 11.4] , the terminal value problem ( 13a ) , ( 13b ) has a unique viscosity (minimax) solutionS , and this solution coincides with the optimal value for the game with payoff 0 −T g(x(t), a(t), b(t)) dt.
Thus,S(−T, x)/T ≡ V ♮ T (x) . Then, by [52, Theorem 7.3] , no subsolution exceeds the minimax solution; thus, we have S(t, x) ≤ −t · V ♮ −t (x) for every t < 0, x ∈ Ω . Then, map ( 12a ) is the guarantee for lower game family with payoffs v T . Since, as noted above, this map satisfies condition ( 19 ) , it is also a subsolution of the lower game family with payoffs v T .
Proof of Proposition 4.
Fix a λ > 0. Following [9] , consider Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE ( 15 ) 
